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This article discusses the effects of the current socio-economic crisis on Spanish youth and their political response to 
it. It does so in three consecutive stages. In the first, it analyses the repercussion of the crisis on young people using 
information from certain social indicators (employment, mobility and education). It then outlines the subjective 
perception of the crisis, i.e., how they are experiencing it and what their hopes are regarding the economy and 
politics. The third part focuses on how young citizens have responded to the situation politically. The article finishes by 
considering what implications may be drawn from that response in terms of citizenship education. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1985 the United Nations held its first International 
Youth Day, with the slogan of “Participation, Develop-
ment and Peace”. Spain was having a turbulent year 
marked by strikes, protests and rising unemployment. 
Nevertheless, they were times of hope. The Spanish 
Constitution, ratified in 1978 after nearly forty years of 
dictatorship under General Franco, had established the 
democratic system, and the nation excitedly awaited 
joining the European Community on January 1, 1986. 
Nearly three decades later, on August 12, 2013, once 
again on International Youth Day, a radio station aired 
the following profile of a 28-year-old Spanish woman, 
born back in that year of 1985, and whom we shall call 
Laura: 
 
“Let’s look at this girl. Let’s say she’s 28 years old. I 
just made her up, so we can make her any age we 
want. As you can see, she’s in her room. She still lives 
with her parents, nothing she can do about it since she 
doesn’t have a job. She did some internships in a 
couple of companies, mostly for free. It was always the 
same story: they said she did good work, and they were 
very pleased with her but they never hired her 
afterwards because, surely she could understand, the 
economy was so bad and all… 
The young woman tinkers with her resume almost 
every day. There’s no space left for any more master’s 
degrees and courses she’s taken: Corporate marketing, 
Computer graphic design, Chinese. Her boyfriend 
couldn’t take it anymore and left the country. He now 
works abroad at a money transfer and export office. 
She blames herself for not going with him and suspects 
she started to lose him that day… 
Her little sister is at college, her father has been 
unemployed for the last four years and her mother has 
barely survived the latest layoffs at her job. That’s all 
the family gets by on. She helps out at home as much 
as she can, but she can’t shake the nasty feeling of 
guilt… 
Our young woman doesn’t believe in politicians. They 
all seem the same to her. Nor has she ever considered 
joining a union, she doesn’t get the monarchy or all 
that stuff with the Pope, cardinals, banks and inter-
national markets. She goes to a few protest marches 
and posts comments on Facebook and Twitter, but 
deep inside she thinks there is no way the world is 
going to change...”
1
 
 
Laura represents thousands of young Spanish men and 
women today. This is perhaps the best-educated gene-
ration in our country: they speak foreign languages, have 
skills with new communication systems unimaginable 
only ten years ago, and many have college degrees, 
which was something only a much lower proportion 
achieved among their parents’ generation and ever fe-
wer among their grandparents’, especially their grand-
mothers. And yet, despite that, this is a disillusioned 
generation, one that no longer identifies with the culture 
of the political transition to democracy in which their 
parents came of age (Fernández-Savater 2012).   
Laura’s political detachment is a focus of interest in 
recent empirical literature, which has highlighted the 
links between the economic crises and the erosion of 
trust in political institutions and representative 
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democracy in different contexts (e.g., Córdova and 
Seligson 2009; Chaistya, Whitefielda 2012; González 
2012). At the European Union level, data show that 
support for democracy has declined over the course of 
the crisis. Spain is the second most harshly effected 
country, just after Greece. Between 2007 and 2011 
satisfaction with democracy receded in Spain by 32.1 
percentage points and trust in national parliaments fell 
29.3 points, well above the average of the 26 EU 
countries studied, in which the decreases were 6.6 and 
7.8 points respectively (Armingeon, Guthmann 2014). 
Recent research by Galais and Blais has also found a 
significant association between the deterioration of the 
individual economical situation and the relaxation of the 
belief in the duty to vote in Spanish citizens under the 
age of 30 (Galais, Blais 2013).  
This article aims to explore this relation in greater 
depth. It does so in three consecutive phases. In the first 
section, it analyses the repercussion of the current socio-
economic crisis on young Spaniards in aspects such as 
employment, mobility and education. After that it 
sketches out how they are experiencing the crisis and 
their hopes regarding economy and politics. The third 
section focuses on how young people have politically 
responded to the situation, especially through the 15-M 
initiative. Lastly, the article ends by wondering about the 
implications that can be drawn from the young citizens’ 
response in terms of how to foster citizenship education 
at schools. 
In order to achieve a more comprehensive inter-
pretation, the analysis uses a variety of sources. The first 
section is based on information and reports from 
national and international organizations such as the 
Spanish Statistical Office (INE) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the 
second section we have worked with the Barometer 
series (2009-2013) by the Spanish Sociological Research 
Centre (CIS). The third section moves to a different 
orientation. In this case, statistical data and surveys on 
subjects related to political participation by the CIS are 
combined with the 15-M movement’s presence on the 
web and the personal involvement of one of the authors. 
 
2 The scope of the crisis among youth 
According to European Commission data from March 
2013, the rate of youth unemployment in the euro zone 
reached 24%. However, the situation is very unequal in 
the different regions. The lowest unemployment rate is 
found in Germany and Austria, at 7.6%, and the highest 
in the southern countries: Greece (59.1%), Spain (55.9%), 
Italy (38.4%) and Portugal (38.3%) (European 
Commission 2013). In the case of Spain, the 
unemployment rate has skyrocketed over the last years, 
according to some sources rising from 37.8% in 2009 
(Eurostat 2012) to 53.2% by 2012, in sharp contrast to 
the overall European Union (EU27) rate of 22.8% that last 
year (Teichgraber 2013). 
This situation affects the younger population segment 
(16 to 19 yrs old) particularly dramatically. Data from the 
Spanish labour force survey from 2013 show the 
unemployment rate for this age group is up to 74.2%, 
higher among women (76.5%) than men (72.5%). In the 
next higher age group (20 to 24 yrs old), the ratio is the 
opposite: joblessness is higher among men (52.7%) than 
women (50.9%). This is the age group that has 
undergone the biggest rise in joblessness over the last six 
years, with the unemployment rate soaring 254% (from 
20.4% in 2008 to 51.9% in 2013).  
 
Table 1: Evolution of the youth unemployment rate from 
2008 to 2013 by age group and gender 
 Total Men Women 
 
16 to 19 
years 
old 
20 to 24 
years 
old 
16 to 19 
years 
old 
20 to 24 
years 
old 
16 to 19 
years 
old 
20 to 24 
years 
old 
2008 39.4% 20.4% 35.8% 20.1% 44.5% 20.8% 
2009 55.3% 33.4% 54.9% 34.6% 55.9% 32.1% 
2010 61.4% 37.0% 60.3% 38.8% 62.9% 35.0% 
2011 64.1% 42.6% 64.4% 44.4% 63.7% 40.6% 
2012 72.7% 49.1% 72.0% 50.5% 73.5% 47.6% 
2013 74.2% 51.9% 72.5% 52.7% 76.5% 50.9% 
Source: INE. Labour Force Survey (2008-2013)
2
 
 
No one is being misled about the profound effects this 
job crisis may cause on a large number of young people 
as well as on social cohesion. For example, a recent 
report from the Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency (EACEA), which depends on the 
European Union, warns that one third of the EU youth 
between the ages of 18 and 24 are at risk of social 
exclusion (Paolini et al. 2013). Along with these effects, 
the scarcity of financial resources keeps young people 
from emancipation and starting their own family, or 
forces them to emigrate abroad in search of a job and a 
better life. The following table shows the flow of 
emigration of Spanish youth aged 20 to 24 years old, the 
age group that usually corresponds with the end of 
higher education. As can be seen, the flow is always 
higher in women, who also attain higher levels of 
education, representing 54.3% of total university 
enrolment (MECD 2013). In the six years covered, from 
2008 to 2013, the flow of immigration has gone up by 
242%, and higher proportionally among women than 
men. 
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Source: Based on data from the Labour Force 
Survey- INE (2008-2013) 
Table 2: Evolution of the flow of emigration abroad of 
Spanish youth aged 20 to 24 (2008-2013) 
 Total Men Women 
2008 1909 906 1003 
2009 1821 858 963 
2010 2183 1006 1177 
2011 2930 1367 1563 
2012 3252 1510 1742 
2013 4615 2145 2470 
Ratio 2008-13 241.7% 236.8% 246.3% 
Source: INE. Migration Studies (2008-2013). Unit: 
migratory movements
3
 
 
These data must necessarily be juxtaposed with young 
people’s education and training, which is one of the most 
important variables in relation to economic crises (e.g., 
Varghese 2009, 2010; Barakat, Holler, Prettner, Schuster 
2010; Hartleya 2010; Shafiq 2010; Ball, Maguire and 
Goodson 2012). Therefore, the report from the EACEA on 
the social exclusion of youth in Europe, mentioned 
above, states that on the average in the EU countries, 
the likelihood for youth to suffer from “material want” is 
7 times greater in those who dropped out at the age of 
16 than in those who reached higher education (Paolini 
et al. 2013, p. 13). The report goes on to note that Spain 
is among the countries where this rate is lower than the 
average (ibid.). However, this observation requires a few 
caveats. According to the data from the Spanish Labour 
Force Survey, this ratio shows a more complex profile in 
which the effect of levels of education on job possibili-
ties has become greater over the course of the crisis. As 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of unemployment by level  
of schooling (young adults from 20 to 24 years old)
4
  
shown in the graph (figure 1) below, the difference in the 
unemployment rate of young people with a primary 
school education and those with higher education was 
14.1 percentage points in 2008 and rose to 19.4 points in 
2013. The situation reached its peaks in 2010, with a 
difference of 24.2 points, and 2012, with 23.6 points. In 
primary education the line is fluctuant, while in higher 
education the growing tendency is permanent and 
softer. 
Given these results, one would expect to see an upturn 
in the young people’s levels of schooling in an attempt to 
open more doors in these times of crisis. The graph 
below (figure 2) illustrates what has happened in that 
regard over the last six years. It shows that the 
proportional increase in schooling has mostly been 
concentrated on upper secondary education, i.e., the last 
two years of high school (grades 11 and 12). Fewer 
students are willing to stop at a lower secondary 
certificate (grade 10, the end of compulsory formal 
education in Spain), but rather aspire to a more thorough 
upper secondary education, which in Spain comprises 
the Baccalaureate as well as secondary-level technical/ 
vocation training. As regards higher education, the 
increase is less pronounced, perhaps due to the 
hopelessness in young people and the lack of financial 
resources in this recessionary context to afford an 
education that, in the case of university studies, involves 
a sustained financial burden for at least 4 years, and 
whose return on investment is not always clearly 
perceived. 
The Education at a Glance report from 2013 confirms 
these data in the context of the OECD. It reports that the 
percentage of youth who continue studying after 
completing compulsory education has increased in Spain 
faster than the OECD average. In 2008, roughly 81% of 
Spanish youth aged 15 to 19 and 21% aged 20 to 29 were 
enrolled, but by 2011 these percentages had increased 
to 86% and 26%, respectively. In comparison, in the 
OECD nations enrolment among 15-to-19-year-olds went 
up from 81% to 84% and enrolment among 20-to-29-
year-olds went from 25% to 28% over the same period 
(OCDE 2013). 
The trends point to Spanish youth between 15 and 29 
years old staying an average of 6.4 years in the school 
system, which is less than the OECD average of 7.1 years. 
Spanish youth are also inactive for 1.1 years, or 
unemployed for 2.5 years, which is more than the OECD 
average of 2.4 years. This greater difficulty to find a job 
explains that since 2008 the estimated time that youth 
from 15 to 29 years old remain in school has increased by 
almost one year, which, according to the report, 
“suggests that some Spanish youth see education as a 
temporary way to avoid unemployment and a potential 
advantage when they try to return to the job later on” 
(ibid., p. 1). However, the report warns of the fact that 
more than half of the young people in that age group 
who do not study and who hold a part time job would 
like to find a full-time job instead, which is interpreted 
“as an indication that not all young people feel 
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compelled to return to school to increase their chances 
of entering the job market at some future stage” (ibid., p. 
6). 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of levels of education among youth 
(20-24 years old) 
 
Source: INE. Labour force survey (2008-2013). Schooling 
completed 
 
The difficulty increases when 
nothing more can be expected 
from the education system, 
which is giving rise to the 
phenomenon of the NEET 
generation (“Not in Education, 
Employment or Training”). In 
Spain, more than 20% of the 
youth aged 15-29 -in contrast 
to the OECD average of 16%- 
found themselves in this situ-
ation in 2011. It is significant 
that the NEETs in this age 
group with higher education 
increased in Spain by appro-
ximately 69% between 2008 
and 2011. This increase is 
much greater than the OECD 
average for the same period, 
which was 24%, and that of the 
European Union (EU21), which 
rose by 29% (ibid., p. 10). 
 
3 How young people perceive the situation 
What do young people think of this crisis situation? To 
answer this question we turn to an analysis of the 
Barometer published by the Spanish Sociological 
Research Centre (CIS) from January 2009 to June 2013 
(figure 3).
5
 As expected, unemployment and financial 
hardships from the last five years have consolidated their 
ranking as the main problems our country has for young 
people, identified as such by 70.6% and 55.9% 
respectively. With them in the top ten are a set of 
difficulties regarding basic social rights (housing, edu-
cation and health care) and questions specifically about 
immigration and terrorism. It is significant, how-ever, 
that the third largest problem in the nation, as noted by 
21.1% of the young people, involves politicians, politics 
and political parties in general, and that the top ten list 
also includes corruption and fraud in the public powers 
(7.3%) and the current administration and specific 
politicians or political parties (4.5%). 
The economy and politics are both aspects that make 
the future uncertain for young people. As shown in the 
table, also made from the 2009-2013 CIS Barometer data 
(table 3), the proportion of young adults who think the 
two aspects will get worse in the near future is greater 
than those who think it will get better. This does not 
keep young people from being slightly more optimistic 
than the population at large as regards the economy. In 
contrast, regarding politics their opinion is more pola-
rized, with larger proportions of youth than the general 
population who think it will worsen or improve. In both 
populations, and for both aspects, though mostly in 
politics, the greatest percentage is for those who make 
no claim as to whether the near future will get better or 
worse. 
 
Figure 3: Main problems facing the country (youth 18-25 
yrs old) 
Source: CIS. Barometer (January 2009 – June 2013) 
 
If we consider what has happened over these last five 
years (figure 4), pessimism has increased in terms of 
politics and the economy, although with a more fluc-
tuating profile in the case of the economy. It should be 
noted that in January 2012, following the last general 
elections, optimism among youth increased regarding 
politics but not regarding the economy, which entered a 
phase of plummeting pessimism. Then, in the first half of 
Journal of Social Science Education                                 ©JSSE 2014 
Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2014                                                                   ISSN 1618–5293 
             8 
2013, the trend reverses. Hope arises regarding the 
economy but politics drops to a record low. 
 
Table 3 Young people’s outlook on the economy and 
politics in the near future 
  Better Same Worse 
THE 
ECONOMY 
Total 18.0% 36.0% 35.7% 
Youth (18-
25) 19.3% 38.5% 34.7% 
POLITICS 
Total 13.5% 47.2% 19.0% 
Youth (18-
25) 15.5% 49.1% 22.8% 
Source: CIS. Barometer (January 2009 – June 2013) 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of expectations of young people 
(aged 18-25) regarding the economy and politics
6
 
 
Source: CIS. Barometer (January 2009 – June 2013) 
 
4 Young people’s political response to the crisis 
The perception of the socio-economic context is reflec-
ted in the political attitudes of youth. Back in the 1920s, 
the then President of the Government in Spain, Álvaro de 
Figueroa, Count of Romanones, bemoaned the scarce 
political interest held by young people when he said:  
 
“The ball has produced important changes to 
modern life, and in every corner of the world, politics 
being no exception, contributing to youth’s distancing 
itself from it. In the past, students abandoned the 
university to join the ranks of Carlists or to fight for 
freedom in barricades; today more than a few drop 
out of college to become professional ball players; 
this fact is regrettable, since the absence of youth in 
politics produces heinous effects; their vim and verve 
have no substitute” (Figueroa 1999, p. 12).
7
 
 
One hundred years later, plagued on the national and 
international scene with historical events that have 
called democratic systems into question, it cannot be 
said that Spanish youth are politically apathetic. At least 
some of the young people have become active subjects 
politically, even if politics is understood in a very differ-
rent way. Rather than indifference, what we see today is 
overall distrust of institutional politics. Compared to 
15.5% and 16% of the youth who state their indifference 
to or boredom with politics, are 40.6% who say they feel 
distrust and 11.2% irritation. On the other hand, only 
11.8% state being interested and 3.1% enthusiastic.  
 
Table 4: Feelings in young people regarding politics (15-
29 yrs old) 
Enthusiasm 3.1% 
Indifference 15.5% 
Boredom 16.0% 
Distrust 40.6% 
Irritation 11.2% 
Interest 11.8% 
Other 
feeling 
0.3% 
Don’t know 0.7% 
No answer 0.8% 
Source: CIS. Study on political culture of young people 
(CIS 2011b) 
 
This distrust and disdain is directed primarily at the 
institutional forms of representative politics. To prove it, 
it suffices to look at what has happened in the last 
general elections. The table below (table 5) uses data 
from post-electoral polls taken from the CIS Barometer 
to show the turnout of young voters with respect to the 
total voting population in the last two general elections 
held in Spain. 
 
Table 5: Turnout in the general elections of 2008 and 
2011  
  
2008 
Elections: 
youth 
(18-24) 
2008 
Elections: 
Total 
2011 
Elections: 
youth (18-
24) 
2011 
Elections: 
Total 
Voted 76.5% 86.9% 74.6% 83.7% 
Preferred not 
to vote 
17.0% 9.1% 19.9% 11.7% 
Couldn’t vote 5.8% 3.5% 5.1% 4.3% 
No answer 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 
Source: CIS. Post-electoral studies on the general 
elections of 2008 and 2011(CIS 2008 and 2011c) 
 
As can be seen, young people 18 to 24 years old are the 
ones who have the highest abstention rate. In the last 
two elections, the ones who chose not to vote exceeded 
17%, and those who could not, 5%. On the other hand, 
the table shows an overall decline in voting in 2011 with 
respect to 2008, down 3.2 percentage points, which 
however was less pronounced (1.9 points) among the 
younger voters. 
The reasons why young people abstained from voting 
in the 2011 general elections were not very different 
from the ones for the general public. In both cases, the 
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most frequent motive was distrust of political parties and 
politicians, followed by the lack of suitable alternatives, 
the pointlessness of voting and the chance to show 
discontent by abstention. For the electorate, consisting 
of all eligible persons 18 and older, an important motive 
was their weariness with politics and elections. Although 
this reason was not as strong among the youngest 
voters, it was still mentioned by more than 13% of them. 
In contrast, a stronger reason among young people in the 
electorate was that they felt disoriented and did not 
know who to vote for. 
 
Table 6: Reasons for abstention in the 2011 general 
elections 
  
Youth aged 18 
to 24 Total 
No trust in any party or politician  45.7% 42.6% 
No suitable alternative 38.0% 37.3% 
Whether you vote or not, it won’t 
make any difference anyway 32.7% 28.9% 
To show their discontent 21.0% 25.5% 
Disoriented, did not know who to 
vote for 14.8% 6.5% 
Tired of politics and elections 13.8% 26.7% 
Other reasons 11.4% 12.0% 
Don’t know / No answer 22.7% 20.5% 
Source: CIS. Post-electoral study on the general elections 
of 2011(CIS 2011c) 
 
More than a fifth (21.8%) of the young people between 
18 and 24 years old in the post-election poll defined 
themselves politically as “liberal”, the most chosen 
position, and in contrast to other options featured in the 
survey, such as socialist, nationalist or even conservative, 
it is hard to peg to any political formation in particular. 
This is in line with 57.5% of the young people stating that 
they do not feel any affinity to any party or coalition. 
Three fourths (76.2%) feel that politicians do not care 
much about what people their age think, and even more 
(81.2%) think that people in power are only looking out 
for their own interests (CIS 2011c).  
The results of these surveys reveal the despair that 
built up in the time between elections, and was vented a 
few months prior to the 2011 elections in the social 
uprising represented in the 15-M movement, which got 
its name because it broke out in a large protest that year 
on May 15. Many saw this as a response to the inability 
of institutional politics to deal with the problems the 
country had been facing since 2009. The movement, 
which was inspired in part by Stèphane Hessel’s book 
Time for Outrage! (2011) and React by José Luís 
Sampedro and others (2011), with a foreword by Hessel, 
brought together many different citizen groups and 
platforms. It sprang up out of a multitudinous protest 
called on the 15 of May, which ended in occupation of 
the Puerta del Sol, the main square in Spain’s capital 
Madrid, where the headquarters of the regional 
presidency are located.
8
 The protests continued into a 
large-scale camp-out. The protesters were turned out 
the next day, but the effect on them was not what was 
intended: it made many of them set up tents, not only in 
the square in Madrid but also in squares in many other 
cities in Spain, the largest camp being the one in the 
Plaza de Cataluña in Barcelona. The campers in the 
Puerta del Sol and the Plaza de Cataluña, and others, 
decided to stay in the plazas at least until the municipal 
elections on May 22, which was against the electoral 
regulations. Support for the movement was not confined 
to Spain: throughout the world, Spanish residents abroad 
and local sympathizers alike marched together in cities 
such as London, Amsterdam, Istanbul, New York, Paris, 
Brussels, Bogota and Bologna (Hughes 2011, p. 408).  
The 15-M movement was conceived and organized on 
line. Blogs and websites of collectives, Facebook, Twitter, 
Whatsapp, YouTube, etc. were essential for spreading 
the message and mobilizing the citizens.
9
 Their 
Democracia real ya (Real democracy now) website gave 
the movement an ability to reach out to a wider audi-
ence while providing an identity to different groups 
towards the inside.
10
 The virtual presence of the 
movement was combined with the occupation of public 
squares, where the activists held daily assemblies to deal 
with the problems of the country. They organized into 
commissions and interest groups to diversify the subject 
matters. From the start, the movement took on a hori-
zontal assembly-type profile that shied away from leader 
personalities and opposed the possibility of certain 
leaders becoming self-appointed official spokespersons. 
The chance to boost the effectiveness of the 
movement occurred a week later, on May 22, with the 
municipal and regional elections in several Spanish 
autonomous communities. In the elections for the 
Assembly of the Comunidad de Madrid, where the 
movement began, voter turnout among young people 
and the population at large was only slightly lower than 
in the previous elections in 2007, and in fact young 
people abstained less than they had originally claimed.  
 
Table 7: Participation in the regional elections of 2007 
and 2011 in the Comunidad de Madrid 
  
2007 
elections: 
(18-24 
yrs) 
2007 
elections: 
Total 
2011 
elections: 
youth (18-
24) 
2011 
elections: 
Total 
Voted 70.4% 81.6% 69.6% 80.7% 
Preferred not 
to vote  
23.5% 12.2% 22.8% 15.6% 
Could not vote 6.1% 6.2% 7.6% 3.3% 
Source: CIS. Post electoral studies on regional and local 
2007 and 2011 elections in the Comunidad de Madrid 
(CIS 2007 and 2011a) 
 
A large percentage of young people (41.8%) answered 
that the 15-M movement had influenced them a lot 
when it came to casting their vote in the 2011 elections 
(CIS 2011a, question 18). However, this influence was not 
reflected as much in their abstention as it was in the 
composition of the Assembly. Whereas in the 2007 
election the two main national parties -the People’s 
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Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 
(PSOE)- together garnered 90.8% of the seats, in the 
2011 elections this proportion was reduced to 83.7%, 
which meant a decline of 7.1%. Something similar 
happened in the general elections held a few months 
later: in 2008, 323 of the 350 seats in Congress went to 
the two main parties; this dropped by 8.4%, to 296, in 
the 2011 elections.
11
 In both cases, the loser was the 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. Although many factors 
contributed to these results, especially the fatigue of the 
socialist party in power, the 15-M movement took it as a 
triumph of their stance against bipartisan politics (Cioni 
2011; Anduiza, Martín, Mateos 2014).
12
 
The movement has been kept very much alive 
throughout its existence, especially in the large urban 
areas. Its members have continued their work in neigh-
bourhoods and villages, from their street assemblies or 
at social centres. As of the autumn of 2012, a sector of 
the movement became more radicalized, with protest 
demonstrations supported by the “Plataforma ¡En Pie!”, 
(Stand Up Platform) whose goal was to “surround/siege 
the congress building” to achieve a dissolution of 
parliament and the installation of a transition process 
toward a different political and economic model. The 
movement is now taking a greater stance on questioning 
the neoliberal capitalist system, generating proposals 
they call constituent power, and reclaiming what is 
“common”.
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5 Conclusion: some implications for citizenship 
education 
The protest demonstration that arose in Spain on the 
15th of May of 2011 may be considered as the social 
response, especially among young people, to what many 
perceive as a sombre period in our young democracy. 
Spain has one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
European Union, which has a dramatic effect on young 
adults. Between 2008 and 2013, unemployment among 
20- to 24-year-olds went up by 254%. In the same period, 
the flow of emigration abroad for those same young 
adults rose by 242%. One effect of the economic 
recession has been the increased importance of schoo-
ling for improving one’s chances of finding a job. While in 
2008 the difference in unemployment between young 
adults who had not finished high school and those with a 
college education was 14.1 percentage points, by 2013 
that difference had risen to 19.4 points. This trend, and 
the difficulties in finding a job, explains that since 2008 
the estimated time young people remain in school has 
increased by almost a year, though still short of the 
average among OECD countries. The demand for 
education is concentrated most at the upper secondary 
level whereas higher and university education shows a 
minimum increase, perhaps due to the difficulties during 
a recession in making ends meet, especially with the 
raise in tuition and fees and the new policies on financial 
aid. 
Unemployment and economic hardship are not, how-
ever, the only problems faced by our young people. 
Spanish youth have trouble with political action, the 
government and the parties. Institutional politics cause 
more distrust and outrage than indifference. Conse-
quently, the response has not been so much political 
abstention as seeking out an alternative, which was 
found in what became known as the 15-M movement. 
This movement has been deemed “one of the 
expressions of outrage of what is likely the most well-
educated generation in history” (Hernández, Robles and 
Martínez 2013, p. 64). As happened in analogous 
movements in Iceland, Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab 
countries during the Days of Rage, and in the US with 
Occupy (Castells 2012) 15-M may be characterized as a 
techno-illustrated civic initiative. Its protesters included 
many university students who, among young adults of 
their age, are the most willing to participate politically, 
whether formally or informally (Martin 2007). These are 
young people who grew up in the digital era, students 
who have their world on the Internet and in social media.  
The 15-M phenomenon acts as a stimulus to rethinking 
how to handle citizenship education at school. According 
to the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 
(ICSS) of the International Association for the Evaluation 
of Educational Achievement (IEA), Spanish students in 
secondary school have a moderate level of civic 
knowledge, average among the countries studied, but 
below many European countries. They also support 
democratic values, gender equality and immigrants’ 
rights more than their classmates in other countries. 
However, they fail in their critical skills and ability to feel 
like active citizens. Thus, they are below average in their 
ability to analyze or reason their knowledge, in their 
interest in political affairs and in their perception of their 
political and citizen effectiveness (understand a political 
problem, defend their opinion on a controversial subject, 
run for the School Board, etc.). Our students have the 
feeling that their teachers do not encourage them to 
participate, to give their opinion or to consider different 
positions on a problem and, generally, as the study 
points out, the answers from students, teachers and 
school principals indicate a lack of participatory culture in 
the classroom (Instituto de Evaluación 2010, p. 27-29). 
A comparison of these results from the ICCS with the 
capacity for political action of young people as witnessed 
in the 15-M movement reveals a clear gap between 
these two worlds. Schools do not prepare students 
enough to become active citizens, at least in the sense it 
is understood at the ICCS. And yet, 15-M participants 
show this competence in their ability at political 
mobilization. Indeed, adherents to the 15-M had a 
particular profile. They were young people affected by 
the consequences of the crisis, with high levels of 
education and resources for understanding and acting in 
the political reality, digital natives widely connected, 
involved in community life and with prior experience in 
political participation (Anduiza, Martín, Mateos 2014 p. 
149-157). In consequence, the existing gap indicates that 
school must reinforce its civic role today more than ever. 
Exercising the rights of citizenship today requires more 
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than being good at reading and writing. The school's 
shirking of its responsibility may thus lead to the emer-
gence of a new class differentiation of enlightened 
citizens who find opportunities for literacy in the new 
resources and skills at the superior levels of the 
education system or outside of it, and those who do not.  
As public spaces of collective living, schools can provide 
a setting for young citizens to learn early on how to 
participate actively in their groups and institutions, to 
know the demands involved in participating in formal 
contexts, to move with a critical eye in social networks, 
to share goals and responsibilities, to modulate their 
interests with other people’s, to appreciate the value of 
tolerance and recognition (Guío 2012). Learners must 
gradually come to understand the political and social 
processes they are immersed in, they must know their 
rights and duties, and be able to recognize shortcomings 
of the system, and to propose alternatives and actions to 
benefit the well-being of their groups and of society at 
large. Fostering a participatory culture at school also 
means making use of the resources offered by the 
community, for instance by having students participate 
in the dynamics of self-organization, fair trade activities, 
markets and solidarity drives, shared ecological vege-
table gardens, volunteer work, children’s and youth 
councils at their town hall, town council sessions open to 
the public, etc.  
By encouraging participation in these types of 
experiences, the hope is to use the dynamics at and 
beyond the school to promote democratic living not as 
something guaranteed or closed, but as a living ideal con-
tinually being constructed by everyone in the different 
spheres of daily life. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 Report by Severino Donate: International Youth Day with almost two 
million jobless youth in Spain. Hoy por hoy (radio program). Cadena Ser, 
August 12, 2013. Audio available at: http://www.cadenaser.com/ 
espana/audios/dia-internacional-juventud-millones-jovenes-parados-
espana/csrcsrpor/20130812csrcsrnac_11/Aes. [Accessed:12/8/13]. 
2 INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute) 
3 Data for 2013 are estimated. 
4
 As per the categories from the National Education Classification 
(CNED) adapted by the National Statistics Institute 
5 These analyses were completed in November 2013. The barometers 
used were those of January and June in the period between January 
2009 and June 2013. 
6
 Differences in percentages between young people who think that the 
economic or political situation will get better and those who think it will 
get worse in the months from January to June of the period considered.  
7 Carlism was a Spanish political movement of traditionalist character, 
originating in the 1820s. It looked for the establishment of an 
alternative branch of the dynasty of the Bourbons to the Spanish 
throne, which originally advocated a return to the Old Regime. 
8 http://tomalaplaza.net/ 
9 There are more than 500 videos on YouTube tagged as “Spanish 
revolution”. See 
http://www.youtube.com/user/spanishrevolutionsol?feature=watch 
10 http://www.democraciarealya.es  
11 Information using the electoral results from the elections to the 
Assembly of Madrid and the general elections, available respectively at 
http://www.asambleamadrid.es     and 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min 
12 Several political projects have emerged from the 15-M movement, 
including Podemos ( “We Can” Party) which won five seats in the 
European Parliament elections in May 2014. 
13 A Foundation of Commons, which includes groups from many 
different areas of Spain, has been created under the auspices of 
theoreticians such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2012). 
